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我刚刚经历了 Anthropic这可能是我本月读到的最疯狂的文章。他们记录了黑客、政府、骗子和中国人工智能实验室都使用了 Claude 在完全不同的方式下。
有些情况是疯狂的。
这是一个简要回顾。疑似与俄罗斯政府有关联的组织被指控使用了 Claude 在钓鱼、入侵、数据盗窃和恶意软件开发(包括重建恶意软件)方面,包括重建恶意软件。据报道,超过20个组织受到了影响。ShinyHunters-linked hackers used AI agents to scan 1.8M Android apps for exposed secrets and help run breaches across 100,000+ Android devices.多家公司。
Anthropic 这些操作中,代理几乎承担了大部分工作。一个由中国公司建立的自动化漏洞研究和攻击工具搭建系统在几乎没有监督的情况下继续朝着目标努力。 Claude 它也被用于政府监控。一位顾问使用它为马里开发了Lakana 360。服务,旨在监控全国大约2.5亿张SIM卡,包括通话、短信和语音。拦截、监控列表和自动情报档案。该完成的系统是本地运行的,因此即使 anthropic 禁止账户后,它不会关闭它。 Anthropic 找到 Claude 在六种武器项目中被使用。
一个来自也门的组织使用了多个 Claude Code 在指导火箭、弹道导弹和高速滑翔项目时,我们正在处理实例。他们实际上测试了一枚火箭,结果失败了,然后又回到了 Claude 之后,一支来自俄罗斯的团队正在开发能够自主执行FPV自杀无人机。识别目标类,包括人类,并在无需人类最终决定的情况下批准致命行动。一与中国相关的项目开发了电子战和空中防御抑制系统,后来又更改了其计划。台湾有12个目标,包括雷达站、机场和指挥基础设施。 Anthropic 发现多个影响操作,包括假新闻网络、假政治账户和宣传操作然后是这个 fucking 爱情生意。超过20个约会应用。
> 4,700+ AI角色。
> 25,000+ 与他们交谈的人。
> 大约2.36亿 Claude 两周后,将有消息。
当有人想要视频通话或社交关注时,真正的自由职业者可以介入提供服务。假的头像看起来很逼真。 Anthropic 他们说他们现在已经抓到了来自阿里、月光、的活动。 DeepSeek, https://z.ai/, 小米、SenseTime和MiniMax。
据称,阿里巴巴独自运营了超过15亿次的请求。 Claude 5月到7月之间的交换活动,峰值达到了每天近3000次。(在此之前,我写了一篇关于蒸馏的文章)月球计划:2300万+。 DeepSeek12.1M+ 在14天内。这正是问题所在。
Anthropic “月球任务”说 DeepSeek 有时会将来自自己用户的请求通过 Claude 不告诉他们。
这些请求包括内部公司文件、源代码、实时凭证、监控。数据和其他敏感信息。 Claude他的隐含推理。
Anthropic 有人说,一个实验室测试了超过12,000个不同的请求,每个请求都尝试不同的方法,直到找到能够工作的技术。而且扩大了它们的规模。
这就是 TLDR。
让我感觉像 👇
有些情况是疯狂的。
这是一个简要回顾。疑似与俄罗斯政府有关联的组织被指控使用了 Claude 在钓鱼、入侵、数据盗窃和恶意软件开发(包括重建恶意软件)方面,包括重建恶意软件。据报道,超过20个组织受到了影响。ShinyHunters-linked hackers used AI agents to scan 1.8M Android apps for exposed secrets and help run breaches across 100,000+ Android devices.多家公司。
Anthropic 这些操作中,代理几乎承担了大部分工作。一个由中国公司建立的自动化漏洞研究和攻击工具搭建系统在几乎没有监督的情况下继续朝着目标努力。 Claude 它也被用于政府监控。一位顾问使用它为马里开发了Lakana 360。服务,旨在监控全国大约2.5亿张SIM卡,包括通话、短信和语音。拦截、监控列表和自动情报档案。该完成的系统是本地运行的,因此即使 anthropic 禁止账户后,它不会关闭它。 Anthropic 找到 Claude 在六种武器项目中被使用。
一个来自也门的组织使用了多个 Claude Code 在指导火箭、弹道导弹和高速滑翔项目时,我们正在处理实例。他们实际上测试了一枚火箭,结果失败了,然后又回到了 Claude 之后,一支来自俄罗斯的团队正在开发能够自主执行FPV自杀无人机。识别目标类,包括人类,并在无需人类最终决定的情况下批准致命行动。一与中国相关的项目开发了电子战和空中防御抑制系统,后来又更改了其计划。台湾有12个目标,包括雷达站、机场和指挥基础设施。 Anthropic 发现多个影响操作,包括假新闻网络、假政治账户和宣传操作然后是这个 fucking 爱情生意。超过20个约会应用。
> 4,700+ AI角色。
> 25,000+ 与他们交谈的人。
> 大约2.36亿 Claude 两周后,将有消息。
当有人想要视频通话或社交关注时,真正的自由职业者可以介入提供服务。假的头像看起来很逼真。 Anthropic 他们说他们现在已经抓到了来自阿里、月光、的活动。 DeepSeek, https://z.ai/, 小米、SenseTime和MiniMax。
据称,阿里巴巴独自运营了超过15亿次的请求。 Claude 5月到7月之间的交换活动,峰值达到了每天近3000次。(在此之前,我写了一篇关于蒸馏的文章)月球计划:2300万+。 DeepSeek12.1M+ 在14天内。这正是问题所在。
Anthropic “月球任务”说 DeepSeek 有时会将来自自己用户的请求通过 Claude 不告诉他们。
这些请求包括内部公司文件、源代码、实时凭证、监控。数据和其他敏感信息。 Claude他的隐含推理。
Anthropic 有人说,一个实验室测试了超过12,000个不同的请求,每个请求都尝试不同的方法,直到找到能够工作的技术。而且扩大了它们的规模。
这就是 TLDR。
让我感觉像 👇
查看原文
原帖正文
I just went through Anthropic’s threat report & woah!This is genuinely the craziest article I’ve read all month.They documented hackers, governments, scammers and Chinese AI labs all using Claude in completely different ways.& some of the cases are insane.Here’s a TLDR;⟣ A suspected Russian state linked group used Claude across phishing, intrusion, data theft and malware development, including rebuilding malware after security products detected it.According to the article, more than 20 organizations were targeted.⟣ ShinyHunters-linked hackers used AI agents to scan 1.8M Android apps for exposed secrets and help run breaches across multiple companies.Anthropic says the agents did nearly all the work in some operations.⟣ A China-based group built an automated exploit setup that could research vulnerabilities, build offensive tools and keep working against targets with little to no supervision.⟣ Claude was also being used for government surveillance.One consultant used it to build Lakana 360 for Mali’s intelligence service, a system designed to monitor roughly 25M SIM cards across the country, including calls, messages, voice interception, watchlists and automated intelligence dossiers.The finished system runs locally, so even if anthropic bans the account, it won’t shut it down.⟣ Anthropic found Claude being used across six weapons programs.One Yemen-based group used multiple Claude Code instances while working on guided rockets, ballistic missiles and a hypersonic-glide project.They actually tested one of the rockets, it failed, and they returned to Claude afterwards to diagnose the problem.⟣ A Russia-based team was working on autonomous FPV kamikaze drones capable of identifying target classes, including humans, and approving lethal engagement without a human making the final call.⟣ One China-linked project built electronic-warfare and air-defense suppression systems, then later changed its scenario to 12 targets in Taiwan, including radar sites, air bases and command infrastructure.⟣ Anthropic found multiple influence operations too, including fake news networks, fake political accounts, propaganda operations and systems built to copy the writing style of real people.⟣ Then there’s this fucking dating operation.More than 20 dating apps.
> 4,700+ AI personas.
> 25,000+ people talking to them.
> Around 2.36M Claude messages in two weeks.And when someone wanted a video call or social follow, real gig workers could step in to make the fake profile look legit.⟣ Then Anthropic gets into distillation.They say they’ve now caught campaigns from Alibaba, Moonshot, DeepSeek, https://z.ai/, Xiaomi, SenseTime and MiniMax.Alibaba alone allegedly ran 151M+ Claude exchanges between May and July, peaking at almost 3M per day.(I just wrote a piece on distillation before this)> Moonshot: 23M+.
> DeepSeek: 12.1M+ in 14 days.And this is where it gets messy.Anthropic says Moonshot and DeepSeek were sometimes routing requests from their own users through Claude without telling them.Those requests included internal company documents, source code, live credentials, surveillance data and other sensitive information.⟣ Some labs were also actively trying to extract Claude’s hidden reasoning.Anthropic says one lab tested 12,000+ different requests, each trying a different method, until it found techniques that worked and scaled them up.That’s the TLDR.Got me feeling like 👇
> 4,700+ AI personas.
> 25,000+ people talking to them.
> Around 2.36M Claude messages in two weeks.And when someone wanted a video call or social follow, real gig workers could step in to make the fake profile look legit.⟣ Then Anthropic gets into distillation.They say they’ve now caught campaigns from Alibaba, Moonshot, DeepSeek, https://z.ai/, Xiaomi, SenseTime and MiniMax.Alibaba alone allegedly ran 151M+ Claude exchanges between May and July, peaking at almost 3M per day.(I just wrote a piece on distillation before this)> Moonshot: 23M+.
> DeepSeek: 12.1M+ in 14 days.And this is where it gets messy.Anthropic says Moonshot and DeepSeek were sometimes routing requests from their own users through Claude without telling them.Those requests included internal company documents, source code, live credentials, surveillance data and other sensitive information.⟣ Some labs were also actively trying to extract Claude’s hidden reasoning.Anthropic says one lab tested 12,000+ different requests, each trying a different method, until it found techniques that worked and scaled them up.That’s the TLDR.Got me feeling like 👇
引用自 X
原帖地址:https://x.com/i/status/2098109777536807173
原帖:
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我们将发布迄今为止最详细的威胁情报报告。它涵盖了人们如何试图滥用Claude进行网络攻击、影响操作、监控、生物学和制造武器,以及我们如何找到并阻止他们。我们中断了报告中的每一项操作,并利用了经验教训以加强我们的保障措施。在适当的情况下,我们还与当局和其他AI分享了我们的发现公司。这些案例并不典型:我们重点介绍了一些我们见过的最复杂的滥用情况。但它们尤其值得讨论,因为它们向我们展示了人工智能滥用的发展方向,我们的保障措施在哪里发挥作用,以及他们需要改进的地方。我们发布此报告是为了让其他人能够自己发现相同的活动平台,因此我们可以让公众更清楚地了解新出现的威胁是如何发展的。阅读报告: https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026
查看引用原文
We're publishing our most detailed threat intelligence report to date.It covers how people tried to misuse Claude—for cyberattacks, influence operations, surveillance, biology, and building weapons—and how we found and stopped them.We disrupted every operation in the report, and used the lessons from them to strengthen our safeguards. Where appropriate, we also shared what we found with authorities and other AI companies.These cases are not typical: we’re highlighting some of the most sophisticated misuse we’ve seen. But they’re especially important to discuss, because they show us where AI misuse is headed, where our safeguards work, and where they need to improve.We’re publishing this report so others can spot the same activity on their own platforms, and so we can give the public a clearer view of how emerging threats develop.Read the report: https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026
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